

The wicked hero in the service of the state and society. Social boundaries of the work of soldiers

Introduction

There has been a discussion about whether military service should be seen more as work rather than an institution. Although military service still retains institutional principles (patriotic values, historic traditions, etc.), it is becoming oriented to the principles of business and economics and it can be fairly categorised as work. This can be explored in relation to other professions in terms of power and compensation. There are different ranks within the military granting some people more power. In recent years, as a result of social and political changes, the work of soldiers has been redefined. If we look at how the soldiers' work is constructed in various discourses (media discourse, political discourse, etc.) and how these constructs function in social life, we will see that there is no compatibility between them. They create a continuum describing the work of soldiers in a positive (hero), neutral (normal operation and normal service) and negative (wicked, murderers, mercenaries) way. From the beginning of the 21st century, we can observe the intense (compatible with the neoliberal market policy) development of private military corporations (PMC) which contribute to the privatisation of the work of soldiers (including what soldiers do, and what is involved in their work), hence we can talk about privatising the war or the war as a service. The decision to start working at private military corporations is dictated by both economic (high salaries) and professional factors (the possibility of improving skills and training other soldiers).

This prompted me to ask the following questions: 1) what are the social boundaries of the work of soldiers? 2) which contexts (social, economic, political, etc.) determine their work? 3) who or which groups deem these social boundaries of this specific work? I noticed that what has the greatest impact on the problem

I described is a shift of the borders of state security from the public domain to the private area which results in changing the meaning of the soldiers' work. This shift is not merely a change of means, but it has also significant implications for the conceptualisation of security and for the military profession and the work of soldiers as we traditionally know it. This evokes the question of what the proper division of labour between the private and public sectors is. The article addresses these problems by exploring the long-term consequences outsourcing of security has for the military profession and the work of soldiers. The first section of this article outlines the evolution of military outsourcing. From here the focus shifts to how outsourcing affects the armed forces' ability to retain monopoly over their "own" knowledge and skills base, and how it affects their autonomy, corporateness and service ethic. The implications that this has for the armed forces and the military profession are deliberated. The conclusion is reached that extensive growth and use of private security have affected the intellectual and moral hegemony of the armed forces as the providers of public security. The long-term implications of this for the social structure and identity of the military profession and the work of soldiers are not yet fully realised.

Shifting borders of state security and changing boundaries of the work of soldiers

Since the late 1980s, many governments have advocated the use of the private sector business practices and market methods to provide public goods and services. Based on the principles of neoliberal economic capitalism, this led to the implementation of a new public management (NPM) approach to the public services delivery. Underlying this philosophy is the greater attainment of economic efficiency of government through the contracting out of certain tasks previously considered the exclusive domain or responsibility of the state. The argument is that the successful implementation of the NPM practices leads to more effective and efficient public sector services, whether it is the delivery of public services or security. The implementation of the NPM has not been uniform, and the effects vary depending on state policy, especially when it comes to work generally associated with the military and the legitimate use of collective violence. In Europe and countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States where the NPM has been widely implemented, this has resulted in the ever-increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSC) to perform tasks previously carried out by military personnel or civilians employed by the military (Singer 2001, 20).

Besides logistical support, this includes tasks such as support for combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering, operational support, troop training, technical assistance, and so forth. As a result, many military tasks have been ceded to private contractors who not only support but also deploy them with and

alongside military personnel. Combat remains the last task exclusive to the military, but some private military companies have already offered their services for international interventions that require combat skills. Many observers now claim that the commercial market is better prepared to deal with the present security problems facing the world. It is more flexible, cost effective and quicker to deploy than national armed forces, and private contractors are often better trained and equipped for the array of tasks that militaries are expected to perform. Especially when it comes to the issues of peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and development, many of the private military companies have come to claim this as their domain and advertise a wide range of services they can offer to states and the international community.

The use of civilian contractors to perform military tasks has a profound impact on the armed forces jurisdiction over their profession. Dandeker describes this as affecting the military profession on four different, but interrelated levels (1998, 129). First, he states that they experience a decline in monopoly power to provide a service to clients as it opens up competition from other groups. Military expertise is no longer the sole domain of the armed forces. Second, it erodes the distinctive culture and way of life of the profession as the division of labour segments this autonomous family into various components. This affects the corporateness and internal cohesion of the profession. Third, the client (the state, in the case of the military) comes to exert considerable power over the professional group as imperatives of efficiency and cost-effectiveness outweigh professional concerns. This signifies a loss of autonomy of the military profession over decisions affecting its organisation and functioning. And fourth, a relative social devaluation of the profession in the eyes of the public occurs as other professional groups come to outperform it, or are seen as more viable alternatives to service delivery. This affects the legitimacy of the armed forces (Dandeker 1998).

The context of military outsourcing

The end of the Cold War led to what many believed would be a more peaceful world. Politicians eagerly grabbed the opportunity to cut back on wasteful defence expenditures and channel state resources to the more pressing needs. Worldwide, this resulted in the downsizing of the armed forces, reducing personnel numbers by approximately a third in many cases. In the global context, more than 7 million servicemen were thrust into the employment market. Extensive cutbacks in defence budgets and military equipment followed (Jäger et al. 2007, 458). On the supply side, this meant that both military expertise and equipment were in surplus supply at relatively modest prices on the open market. However, just as the armed forces were adjusting their force and organisational structures to the new security environment, a new wave of violence flared up in various parts of the world, posing new threats to global peace and security.

Although these new security concerns gave the armed forces a newfound legitimacy, many now no longer possessed the capacity to deal with these complex emergencies. There was also a political reluctance to become involved in these messy low-intensity civil wars, with their complicated ethnic agendas and blurred boundaries between combatants and civilians (Burk 1998, 25). This created a ready market for private military forces which stepped in to fill this void with surprising speed and efficiency. The most well-known example in the early 1990s was the case of Executive Outcomes, comprising of former South African Defence Force personnel in Angola and Sierra Leone (Stringer 2007, 229). Voids in the market were but one factor contributing to the growth in the private security and military sector. Two other important revolutions were underway that were driving the outsourcing trend, the first being the technological revolution in military affairs and the second the privatisation of certain military capabilities (Bharadwaj 2003, 64–82).

For some time, advances in communication and computing technologies have obliged the armed forces to employ a growing segment of civilian specialists to operate and maintain the increasingly sophisticated electronic support and weapons systems. These had become too sophisticated for a usual military practitioner to maintain, repair, and even operate (Terry 2010, 661). Initially, many civilians were employed on a full time or contract basis by the armed forces, but as time progressed support or auxiliary tasks became either civilianised or outsourced to the private sector. This marked the beginning of the second revolution, which led to the privatisation and outsourcing of certain capabilities, and the contracting in of others, depending on the operational requirements of the military.

For the armed forces, this meant the privatisation and outsourcing of certain in-house services or functions, formerly executed by civilian and military personnel employed by them (Stringer 2007). In other cases, this entailed the purchasing of services or functions that did not exist in-house before and were too costly to develop. This marks where the private sector supplies goods or services to the military, but where the military is just one of the many clients of the service provider. Thus, the military is not the dominant client, nor does the purchasing of this service or product have a major influence on the core functions of the military. Examples of such services include catering, vehicle maintenance, and other typical support structure/logistical needs. However, as the armed forces came to experience acute personnel shortages, so the application of NPM reforms was expanded to include many traditional core military specific tasks such as training, education, research, intelligence gathering, and so forth. This led to the evolution of military outsourcing, where the military now became the main client of provider firms who were offering services more directly related to the core business of the armed forces. These companies came to provide a wide diversity of services to the military. The first category are those offering military services such as tactical military assistance, including actual combat services that closely resemble

military competences. This may involve the actual fighting, either as units or as specialists, such as combat pilots. Typically, strong states have not used private military companies in these roles; but weak states, like Angola and Sierra Leone, have brought in such combat support where their own armed forces lacked the necessary capacity to deter threats and to protect strategic assets (Singer 2005). The second category are typical consultant firms. They generally do not operate, but play a strategically important role in force preparation and decision making at the strategic level. This may involve activities such as infantry training and war gaming, to advise politicians on security concerns that influence policy decisions. The third category are firms that provide supplementary military services, and include logistics, intelligence, technical support, maintenance services, and transport, and which may function at both the operational and tactical level. They provide force support and specialise in noncore tasks that the military is unable to build or sustain (Avant 2005, 125). Essentially, it is this segment that has enhanced the expeditionary potential of the armed forces in military operations.

Many are employed in security functions and perform tasks traditionally performed by military personnel. Due to the nature of their work, most carry arms for defensive purposes. This has led to the blurring of military tasks, both in terms of activity performed, and by whom the activity is being performed (Seidman 2010, 716). What this implies is that the provision of security as a public good, as a service provided by the state or international state organisations (like the United Nations) to citizens or the international community, can now be supplied more readily, and possibly more efficiently, by the private sector. The entry of the private sector into the military sphere has fundamentally reshaped the structure of military employment, and will continue to do so. Similar to the private sector and driven by the NPM principles, the military labour force has been restructured along classic post-Fordist lines. What few considered was the effect that the expansive use of private military contractors would have on employment levels, patterns and conditions of service of military personnel in years to come, not only on contracting states but also on other national armed forces who were becoming suppliers of military labour.

Unforeseen consequences for the military profession

Since the 19th century, national armed forces have commanded the monopoly over collective violence in most Western nations. A professional-institutional duality emerged, where only those employed within the armed forces were assumed to be military professionals and possessed the skills required for the legitimate use of collective violence (Nuciari 2003, 69). As such, military professionals were tasked with the unique responsibility of providing the public service of defending their nation. As a bureaucratic profession, the institution determined the

content and boundaries of the military profession, along with those who could serve within the military. However, as the state ceded military tasks to the private sector based on the NPM principles, so this jurisdiction changed and expertise became shared between persons serving within and outside the military. Now civilians became delegated agents of the state, or other actors, in the provision of collective security (McCoy 2010, 672). This meant that the armed forces no longer held the exclusive monopoly over the management and application of violence — that they had lost institutional control over their sphere of work.

Loss of monopoly of knowledge and skills. According to Huntington, the military profession differs from other professions or occupations because it monopolises the knowledge and skills related to the management of violence (1957, 11). Traditionally, this has been both provided and restricted by the profession itself (Abbott 1991, 363). However, with education and training no longer being regarded as core business, this central component of the military profession, the inculcation of military knowledge, has been ceded to outsiders. The military is no longer the sole provider of military knowledge, but has become a consumer thereof. As these private companies become specialists in their field (instead of the military), so they have come to assume the legitimate position of knowledge providers. They are able to both determine the content of what is taught and how it is being taught, through the use of their own particular jargon, behaviour, and approach. This implies not only the loss of control over the knowledge base of the profession but also the inculcation of certain norms, values, and lifestyles of the profession.

The other concern is the effect that the dual labour market for military skills has on the retention of in-house expertise, knowledge, and skills, which has intensified during the second phase of outsourcing. The greatest skill loss within the armed forces is precisely in those core occupational categories where the skills are most valued by the private military and security sector: special forces, medical personnel, intelligence, military police, and those with combat expertise and experience. In these sectors, the armed forces are finding that personnel are ending their contracts earlier than expected, leading to the skills drain and loss of institutional memory. The skills loss is also felt in those positions where the armed forces experience the greatest need in counterterrorism, combat operations, strategic reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare training. This issue has become especially relevant for the special forces units, which have come to play a crucial role in current conflicts requiring counterinsurgency capabilities (Singer 2005). In many cases, they are being offered three times their normal duty pay by the private sector, forcing the armed forces to also increase the pay of these operators (Latham 2009, 45). For the armed forces, this means that they have been obliged to review their employment practices to mitigate the skills loss, or face institutional atrophy. This affects not only Western armed forces who can afford to pay higher wages to curtail attrition but also poorer nations whose personnel resign to join private security and military companies due to the higher salaries.

Loss of autonomy. With the blurring of the boundaries between the provision of security by the public and private security sector, the military can no longer exercise exclusive closure to protect and preserve their profession from the invasion of other powerful actors operating in their domain (McCoy 2010, 672). Where the professional knowledge of military matters is seized or is shared by others, the armed forces jurisdiction over their domain is limited, especially where the superiority of the private sector is touted by government. A unique feature of the military profession that distinguishes it from others is that it only has autonomy within the confines of state policy and legislation. In this respect, the subordination of its own needs to higher political authority is considered a *sui generis* of the military profession. Although the military may exercise internal control over its profession, external control of the military organisation is enforced by the state.

Given the culture of subservience to political authority, military leadership (whose careers may be at stake) has not taken an assertive stand against politicians where policy decisions are deemed detrimental to the functioning of the armed forces or their profession. The enforcement of the NPM principles by the state has in many cases led to a degraded working environment, which has a direct impact on the working lives of military personnel (Volti 2008, 108). This has affected the power, prestige, and status of the military profession, and trust in military leadership's ability to defend and protect the interests of the institution/profession. The recent growth of a form of military unionism in a number of countries across Europe and beyond is driven not only by material conditions but also by the degradation of the profession as a whole (Bartle 2006, 477–500).

The problem is that even where some form of independent representation exists, be it professional associations or military unions, most have tended to focus on the material concerns of members or workplace issues, rather than issues affecting the status or well-being of the profession as a whole. Unlike other professional associations, they have not attempted to control access to the profession nor establish legal protection of the monopoly of skills. In fact, they have played no role in the development of the profession as they presuppose its existence. Consequently, military leadership has found it difficult, in the absence of any powerful lobby group or legal protection, to maintain their professional autonomy, or to regulate the new entrants into their profession — the new civilian military professionals working for the PMSCs. Even where military veterans associations exist, there has been little attempt to regulate the profession as other professional associations do.

A somewhat different scenario is developing in the private security sector. The unregulated nature of the private security industry has resulted in the industry itself trying to develop its own regulations in terms of standards, entry requirements and ethical practice. What these associations hope to achieve is the establishment of an accreditation system to prove their professionalism, the attainment

of market control and access and the creation of an outward appearance of repute and respectability. In so doing, they act as an agent for the private military and security sector, to legitimise their public standing and to establish their boundaries. When organised into professional associations, they are able to act as lobby groups that place them in a strategically better position to negotiate with clients. Thus, the motivation to organise into professional associations is not driven by purely ethical concerns, but by attempts at surveillance, self-regulation and compliance, to advance self-interest. As with other professional bodies, these associations are striving to control the market by erecting legally sanctioned collective controls over the production and sale of their services. The armed forces have little control over this. They generally rely on their paternalistic relationship with the state to protect their profession and articulate their needs at the political level.

This loss of autonomy is felt not only at the political and strategic level but also at the operational level. Problems of contractor readiness and fitness are harder to detect than of their own personnel, who are subject to greater oversight in terms of unit and mission readiness. There is no such oversight system in place for the armed forces to determine whether contractors are fit for the job. A further impediment is that commanders have little authority over contractors. Contractors operate outside the military command structure and this often complicates coordination of tasks and functions.

Furthermore, commanders do not have the legal sanction to compel or discipline contractors should they not perform their tasks adequately, or be guilty of misconduct. When contractor violations occur, commanders are frequently at a loss as to how to deal with such misdeeds. Although now an integral part of military operations, the PMSCs are not subject to the same codes of conduct or restrictions as military personnel. Often it is not clear who is responsible for investigating, prosecuting and punishing offences committed by the PMSCs. Unlike soldiers, who are accountable under their nation's military code of justice, contractors have a murky legal status, undefined by international law, as they do not fit the formal definition of mercenaries (Singer 2005). This duality in the regulation of the conduct of civilian and military personnel has an inevitable impact on military personnel in terms of their own conduct and frame of reference.

Loss of the sense of "corporateness". For the military profession, group solidarity, interdependence, and teamwork are embraced as functional requirements for combat effectiveness. This sense of corporateness is derived from the combat training experience, bond of work and the shared social responsibility of the occupational group toward the goals of the organisation and toward those serving in the military. Only when there is loyalty to the chain of command and a high level of cohesion cultivated by a corporate identity, can the military be successful in accomplishing its mission in the face of danger, even if this entails the loss of the member's own life. In this respect, loyalty is both professional and bureaucratic by virtue of the bureaucratic/professional nature of the military

profession. Contractors are neither part of the chain of command nor under direct military command and as such do not form part of this cohesive group even where they are regarded as part of the total force. In fact, contractors often constitute a highly diverse segment. They come from multiple countries, are employed under different contracts, and speak many different languages (McCoy 2010, 681). In addition, they have different authority structures, methods of operating, communication systems, work practices, cultures, ethics, responsibilities, and motivations. Yet, in many instances, they operate alongside military personnel in close combat-support operations where their actions and commitment to mission success are paramount.

Erosion of service ethic

The image of the military professional is of one who feels a deep sense of responsibility to use their skill to the benefit of the broader society which they have been commissioned to defend (Huntington 1957, 13). The military profession, perhaps more than any other profession, must seek to convince society that their actions are motivated by an ethic of selfless service. Without this commitment society would be loath to allow the military to retain its monopoly over the profession. They must be seen to use their professional knowledge and skills for the public good, and for the military man/woman this may entail the ultimate self-sacrifice, the loss of their own life in the course of their duties. Already in the 1960s, Janowitz observed that those who see the military profession as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a far greater concentration of individuals for whom the military is just another job (Janowitz 1960, 117). The Janowitz's convergence theory proposed that armies and large civilian organisations were undergoing an evolutionary process and were gradually becoming more alike. He explained these trends in terms of the civilianisation of the military profession as a consequence of switching to a model of all-volunteer force (Janowitz 1960).

In the 1970s, Moskos described this as a shift in value orientation from an institutional to an occupational disposition (1986, 378). In terms of ideal types, those adhering to an institutional frame of reference abide by a value system that transcends individual self-interest, in favour of a presumed higher good. For those adhering to an occupational dispensation, the priority of self-interest, rather than that of the employing organisation exists. Implicit in this shift is the change in the value orientation of military professions from defence for the common good to that of individual good (Nuciari 2003). While more recent studies show that military personnel join and serve in the military for a variety of reasons, the argument is made that outsourcing pushes the occupational trend one step further (Battistelli 1997, 467–484; Manigart 2005, 559–582).

Whereas previously the profession was anchored in the institution, the trend has become increasingly occupational, transitional, and detached. While in the past many came to see their employment in the military as merely another job, military training and experience is now seen as a commodity that can be sold to the highest bidder in the labour market. As such, a dual frame of reference has emerged where personnel now remain in the military only if the pay and benefits are comparable. As a result, the military has been compelled to offer retention bonuses to retain key skills. According to Latham, this threatens to undermine the dedication and selfless service the army seeks to retain even more (2009). Where employees are motivated by purely material concerns, the question is raised as to how far such employees are prepared to go to provide security for the public good as part of their job, whether in uniform or not.

While in the military soldiers can be ordered into battle, the same does not hold true for civilian employees. This brings us back to the issue of service ethic and whether civilians can be compelled to work in potentially harmful conflict zones on the basis of a payslip. Despite claims that private military contractors display attitudes comparable to those of military professionals, adhere to those of military professionals, adhere to high levels of professionalism and ethical conduct, ultimately they are employed by companies seeking to make profits at minimal risk (Franke et al. 2010, 725).

As Schaub states, they are not uniformed agents of the state. They are motivated by remuneration rather than social obligation, have divided loyalties, and a questionable corporate identity (2010, 370). Thus, there will always be tensions between the security goals of clients and the companies' desire for profit maximisation. Consequently, the commodification of security has brought about an erosion of altruistic values in much the same way as it has in other sectors.

Although national armed forces are bound to retain their monopoly of collective violence (for now), the reality is that they are no longer able to meet the demands placed upon them. Not only do they find it difficult to recruit, deploy, and retain sufficient personnel for military operations, but social forces such as the decline of interest in and status of the military, together with declining birth-rates in Western states, limit both the quantity and the quality of personnel able or willing to serve in the armed forces. At the same time, the demand for public security, both national and international, is increasing and the private sector is eagerly filling this void across the globe. There is no doubt that they will continue to do so, with growing efficiency and vigor. These external forces have resulted in widespread organisational change within armed forces, affecting the boundaries between the providers of public security. While there are good reasons to be concerned about the activities of the PMSCs, one should not be blind to the valuable contribution they can make to peace and security. They can expand the capabilities of the armed forces and provide the military with both the numerical and the functional flexibility to meet shifting mission demands. The fact that most of the

personnel serving in PMSCs come from military backgrounds means that they often bring with them a wealth of knowledge, expertise, and experience.

They are also conversant with military routines, practices, laws, and customs and they share a similar professional service ethic. The fact that these private military “employees” now equal the number of military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and serve alongside military personnel, indicates that their values and ethos will no doubt penetrate the military. Public opinion is also changing in terms of how these private soldiers are viewed. Private contractors are no longer considered the new “mercenaries” but legitimate actors in the field of security who are doing a “noble” job. What the public often does not know is the extent of contractor deployment and casualties.

According to Latham, by the end of 2009 contractors reported almost 1,800 dead and 40,000 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan and in 2010 accounted for 53 percent of all fatalities. This raises a number of ethical issues around the use of private contractors without public debate and understanding of the political implications this holds. It is clear that the unquestioning stance on this has granted legitimacy and enormous power to the corporate sphere. Furthermore, as the line between self-sacrifice and self-interest in the eyes of the state has become less distinct, so the balance in the provision of public and private security is changing. A telling sign will be the extent to which “client power”, namely the state, will shape this trend, in terms of both regulation of the profession and the provision of services related to war. This evokes the question of what the proper division of labour between the private and public sectors is, and who decides which sector does what. Although some claim that private contractors will never reach the level of infringing on the core functions of the military profession, narrowly defined as those associated directly with the use of physical force in an offensive capacity, or war fighting, this is naive.

For the first time, the armed forces are facing real competition in the provision of public security as the PMSCs come to play an ever-increasing role in both national and international security. This begs the question of whether these firms could take on the UN peacekeeping functions and improve on the UN efforts? Peacekeeping forces are often slow to deploy, poorly trained, underequipped and lack the coherence of the PMSCs. International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), for example, has already offered to assist the United Nations in peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this regard, the United Nations is in a sticky situation, as some nations condone and others condemn the use of private military companies. This becomes particularly difficult where nation states are unwilling to intervene, or abdicate their responsibility toward international security. The PMSCs have precisely the type of counterinsurgency skills necessary to deal with low-intensity conflicts, which are the most common current and likely future conflicts.

The issue then is whether the provision of public security will become a contested terrain between the public and private providers of security. Whatever

the direction, it is clear that these “corporate warriors” are changing the face of the military profession, as well as the future governance and provision of public security. The repercussions for national armed forces, international security and civil–military relations are far reaching. As states both break from and lose control over the military monopoly of private military and security services, this changes power relations both within and among states, as well as how coercive force is used globally. This begs the question: At what point does one say that privatisation has gone too far? The issue is clearly no longer just about cost-effectiveness, efficiency and greater operational flexibility.

In closure, what this demonstrates is that our conception of the military profession and the monopolisation of the sphere of war have been fundamentally influenced by the practice of outsourcing. In this regard, McCoy, writing on the status of professions, claims that the key tasks for the continued success of any profession are to maintain control over its knowledge base, to find ways to combat the ever present tendency for knowledge to become located in organisations or machines rather than its members, to hold its own vis-a-vis the state and to resist attempts at incursion into its jurisdiction by other occupations (McCoy 2010, 690). According to this, the military profession as embodied within the armed forces has lost jurisdiction of their profession on all accounts and willingly ceded this to outsiders. What this means in terms of the intellectual and moral hegemony, social structure and identity of the profession is not yet fully realised. What is surprising is the apathy of both the state and the military leadership as “guardians of the military profession” toward this, and the failure to conceptualise the long-term implications this has for state sovereignty.

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an exponential growth in the use of private military companies. Few have debated the long-term consequences outsourcing of security holds for the military profession and the work of soldiers. The first section of this article outlines the evolution of military outsourcing. The second part focuses on how outsourcing affects the armed forces' ability to retain monopoly over their "own" knowledge and skills base, and how it affects their autonomy and the work of soldiers. The conclusion is reached that growth and use of private security have affected the hegemony of the armed forces as providers of public security.

Zły bohater w służbie państwa i społeczeństwa. Społeczne granice pracy żołnierzy

Abstrakt

Wraz z zakończeniem zimnej wojny nastąpił gwałtowny wzrost wykorzystania prywatnych firm wojskowych. Rzadko można spotkać się jednak z debatami nad długoterminowymi konsekwencjami takiego rodzaju outsourcingu dla zawodu wojskowego oraz pracy żołnierzy. W pierwszej części artykułu przedstawiono, w jaki sposób ewoluował *outsourcing* zadań wojska do prywatnych firm wojskowych. W drugiej części opisane zostało, w jaki sposób *outsourcing* przyczynił się do utraty

przez armię autonomii oraz zdolności do zachowania monopolu na dysponowanie specjalistyczną wiedzą i umiejętnościami oraz jak wpływa to na autonomię armii, a także na pracę żołnierzy. Konkluzją artykułu jest to, że rozwój i wykorzystywanie prywatnych firm wojskowych wpłynęły na hegemonię armii w sferze bezpieczeństwa publicznego.